Fichte’s questions:
A scholar is defined by his relationship to society. Thus, his vocation is his vocation within society. This raises the question: what is the vocation of an isolated, essential man? Of a man as a man? This is the central question of philosophy. What is our vocation, and how can we fulfill it?
Notice that man-as-such is not “the genuinely spiritual element in man, the pure I” (124). The pure I is nothing when isolated; it is never conscious of itself unless “as something empirically determined” (124) which implies input from outside the I. Instead, man-as-such is man without “relationship to rational beings like himself” (125). In this frame, the question above becomes: what distinguishes man from non-human beings?
Fichte assumes that man exists for his own sake. But he also notes that man goes beyond that: “he does not say merely ‘I am’; he adds, ‘I am this or that’” (125). The question becomes, what is man insofar as he is something particular?
The fact that man can be something beyond the pure I does not cancel out the fact that he remains an I. “What he cannot be because he is an I, he ought not to be at all” (126). The I should furthermore not contradict itself, since it is a perfect unity. Whenever an empirically determined I contradicts itself, it is evidence that this I has been affected by the not-I. Fichte’s formula for morality is: “act so that you could consider the maxims fo your willing to be eternal laws for yourself” (126). This is derived from the drive to reach consistency within the I’s behavior. “All of man’s powers, which themselves constitute but one power… should coincide in a complete identity and should harmonize with each other” (127).
The I is undeniably affected by the non-I through things that produce feelings in the I. The I, seeking unity in itself, must seek to shape the world to bring the non-I into harmony with itself and its concepts of how they should be. This is not possible through the will alone; it requires culture, which is the skill of suppresing inclinations that encourage us to behave against our I’s unity, and to modify the world around us. Culture is man’s ultimate goal, since it is the way one can reach “complete harmony with himself” (128). This is the highest good, in Kant’s words.
The highest good can be seen as a pursuit for consistency with “ethical goodness” or consistency with external things. The root of both of these is man’s internal moral nature. Man’s ultimate goal of unity with all is unachievable; otherwise he’d become God. Man’s vocation is not to reach this goal, but to approximate it; to “perfect himself without end” (129). This is the vocation of an isolated man. By teaching this, Fichte hopes to advance humanity to a higher level of culture.
Fichte’s questions:
Society is “the relationship in which rational beings stand to each other”, which assumes other rational beings. Is there anything beyond our imagination of others that corresponds to this imagination? Would they exist even without our imaginations? Fichte claims that we explain some experiences by reference to external rational beings.
For one to reach their highest goal, they must come into harmony with external things. That is, there ought to be something external (i.e., in the not-I) that corresponds to one’s concepts of how things ought be. Man wills that the concepts of reason and rational action be realized in the not-I. Thence the requirement (Bedürfnisse) that other rational beings exist.
To identify them, one must identify their features, starting by rationality. A feature of rationality is purposefulness, or freely achieved harmony of multiplicity in a unity. One cannot know if the behavior of others is free. But one can recognize that they don’t have any other explanation for their empirical I other than the will itself. From this, in a sense, “lack of any consciousness of a cause is itself a consciousness of freedom”. This is how one can be conscious of one’s own free action.
If you, through your free action, alter a thing presented to you, its subsequent behavior is explicable by your free action. Therefore, such alterations can only be explained by reference to a free agent. This is, in Kantian words, “an interaction governed by concepts”, or a purposeful community. This is society.
If it is a fundamental drive to assume other rational beings, then so is socializing with them. This is part of man’s purpose. Living in isolation is contradicting your I’s unity.
Society is distinct from the state: the state aims to perfect society, and ultimately make itself superfluous. However, the fact that society is “it’s own end” (135), does not mean there should be more specific ways to behave in a society. Fichte points out that all people have differing ideals of what humankind should be like, and seek to mold others to that ideal in a “spiritual struggle” (135). This is the origin of the improvement of the species, which is the vocation of society as such. Over time, the “better person will certainly be victorious” (135), although it may take a long time. In short, man is destined for society, and should perfect his sociability skills.
Man’s vocation within society is determined by “the supreme law of self-harmony” (136), which is, in other words, the ethical law. This law demands that the social drive does not contradict itself. Then, since sociability is fundamentally a reciprocal and mutual relationship, man must not seek subordination of the world; rather, coordination with it. This means accepting the free rationality of others. Otherwise, one hasn’t developed their full capabilities as a free man.
Rousseau has said that many a person who considers himself to be the master of others is actually more of a slave than they are. He might have said, with even more accuracy, that anyone who considers himself to be a master of others is himself a slave. If such a person is not a slave in fact, it is still certain that he has a slavish soul and that he will grovel on his knees before the first strong man who subjugates him. The only person who is himself free is that person who wishes to liberate everyone around him and who really does so. (137)
One must not act against others’ will, or employ them as tools, since it places one into contradiction with oneself.
All of the above are negative definitions of one’s role in society. The fact that all humans seek the same goal makes them, in practice, a unified item. Even though the absolute perfection of society is unreachable, man’s vocation in society is to “approximate endlessly to this goal” (138), which Fichte calls unification. This is practically reached by the perfection of oneself by “freely making use of the effect which others have on us and perfecting others by acting in turn upon them as free beings” (138). This involves giving and receiving.
Whoever you may be, because you bear a human face, you are still a member of this great community, No matter how countlessly many intermediaries may be involved in the transmission, I nevertheless have an effect upon you, and you have an effect upon me. No one whose face bears the stamp of reason, no matter how crude, exists for me in vain. But I am unacquainted with you, as you are with me! Still, just as it is certain that we share a common calling – to be good and to become better and better – it is equally certain that there will come a time (it may take millions or trillions of years – what is time!) when I will draw you into my sphere of influence, a time when I will benefit you too and receive benefit from you, at ime when my heart will be joined with yours by the loveliest bond of all – the bond of free, mutual give and take. (139)